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CORPORATE MANSLAUGHTER:  
New Horizon or False Dawn? 
 
Simon Daniels 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The failure of the process of common law to deliver convictions for 
corporate manslaughter in the fatal casualties of the Herald of Free 
Enterprise and the Marchioness contributed much to the resolve of 
Parliament to bring a Corporate Manslaughter Act on to the Statute Books. 
It has been in force, now, for four years; but with only one conviction 
currently to its name, the shipping industry is neither very much the wiser 
nor better informed as to its likely effect on them in the event of another 
maritime disaster. 
This paper examines the evolution of the 2007 Act and, given its 
dependence upon the concept of criminal negligence, its relationship with 
the concept of justice. From this viewpoint, conclusions may be drawn on 
certain case studies that may inform some intriguing speculation on the 
effect which the 2007 Act may have on maritime operations.     
 
The Herald of Free Enterprise and the Common Law 
 
  The English Channel is one of the most crowded seaways in the world 
and, by the time the Herald of Free Enterprise and her sisters were bedded 
down by the mid-1980s, the Dover-Calais run was the most competitive 
crossing, because it was the shortest ± just 22 miles long. The liberalisation 
of an already cut-throat, competitive market-place was forcing the board 
rooms of ferry operators to consider how best to conduct their prime 
function: to maximise a yield for their investors1. It was against this 
background that P & O European Ferries had to make some bold business 
decisions. By the summer of 1986, the boardroom of P & O Ferries was 
thinking hard about its long-term strategy, in order to retain its position in 
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the market-place and satisfy the shareholders. This was the sum of the 
GLUHFWRUV¶ FRQFHUQV VDIHW\ PDQDJHPHQW ZDV QRW DPRQJ WKHLU MRE
descriptions. It was surely no coincidence that, at about this time, it resolved 
to buy out its rival, Townsend Thoresen, thereby reducing the competition 
and spreading the overheads. In February of the following year, the deal was 
completed and the directors of P & O Ferries implemented their plans for 
maximising the financial yield.  
  Their own ferries on the Dover-Calais route were doing their job very 
VDWLVIDFWRULO\WKH\GLGQRWQHHG7RZQVHQG¶VWRQQDJHWKHUHVRLWZDVGHFLGHG
to switch the Herald of Free Enterprise to the Zeebrugge route. The only 
problem was that the linkspans at Zeebrugge had not been designed with the 
Herald LQPLQGVRWKDWIRUWKHYHVVHO¶VXSSHUYHKLFOHGHFNWREHDFFHVVHG
by the ramp, it was necessary to trim the ship by the head and flood her 
ballast tanks, to lower the level of the vehicle deck to the linkspan. 
  When the Herald left Zeebrugge on the 6th March 1987, not all the 
water had been pumped out of the bow ballast tanks, causing her to be some 
three feet down at the bow. Mr Stanley, the assistant bosun, was responsible 
for closing the bow doors but he had been released from duties by the bosun 
before the sailing time. He duly went to his cabin and fell asleep; tragically, 
KHVOHSWWKURXJKWKHµ+DUERXU6WDWLRQV¶FDOOZKLFKRUGHUHGWKHFUHZWRWKHLU
assigned sailinJSRVLWLRQV,WZDVQRWSDUWRIDQ\ERG\HOVH¶VGXWLHVWRHQVXUH
that the bow doors were closed before sailing, save the statutory 
responsibility of the Master to ensure that the vessel was in all respects safe 
to proceed to sea2. Her design of clamshell bow doors made it impossible 
for Captain David Lewry to see from the bridge if the doors were opened or 
closed, though. 
  The Herald sailed at 19.05 local time, with a crew of 80 and some 459 
passengers, 81 cars and 50 commercial vehicles. Passing the outer mole 19 
minutes later, she increased speed, when a bow wave began to build up 
under her prow. At 15 knots, with the bow down three feet lower than 
normal, water began to break over the main car deck through the open doors 
at the rate of 200 tons per minute.  
  In common with other roll on±roll off vessels, the Herald¶V PDLQ
vehicle deck lacked transverse bulkheads and, so, the sudden flood of water 
through the bow doors quickly caused the vessel to become unstable. The 
Herald listed 30 degrees to port almost instantaneously, as water continued 
to pour in and fill the port wing of the vehicle deck, causing her to capsize 
40 seconds later. She settled on the sea bed at slightly more than 90 degrees 
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with the starboard half of her hull above water. There had been no chance 
WRODXQFKDQ\RIWKHVKLS¶VOLIHERDWV 
  At least 150 passengers and 38 members of the crew lost their lives 
when the vessel capsized, the worst disaster for a British vessel in peacetime 
since the sinking of the Titanic in 1912. In accordance with the provisions 
of the Merchant Shipping Act 1970, a Formal Investigation was conducted 
by Mr Justice Sheen3, who found fault with the Master, Chief Officer and 
assistant bosun but, in fairness, the brunt of his condemnation was taken by 
the management of the Owners, finding: 
 
All concerned in management, from the members of the Board of 
Directors down to the junior superintendents, were guilty of fault 
in that all must be regarded as sharing responsibility for the failure 
of management. From top to bottom the body corporate was 
infected with the disease of sloppiness.  
 
6XFK ILQGLQJV ZRXOG ORJLFDOO\ OHDG WR WKH TXHVWLRQ RI WKH RZQHU¶V
DFFRXQWDELOLW\7KH MXGJHH[SUHVVHGKLV ILUPRSLQLRQ WKDW ³7KH%RDUGRI
Directors must accept a heavy responsibility for their lamentable lack of 
GLUHFWLRQV´EXWKRZHYHUEODPHZRUWK\WKHFRPSDQ\ZDVIRUWKHIDLOXUHRI
management, there was no individual who was part of the controlling mind 
of the owner culpable for the manslaughter of the souls lost aboard the ship.  
As a result, a prosecution for corporate manslaughter was misconceived. 
7KHWHVWRIDFRUSRUDWHERG\¶VFULPLQDOOLDELOLW\IRUPDQVODXJKWHUKDG
for long been dependent upon whether a director or senior manager of the 
company ± part of the 'controlling mind and will' of the company ± was 
personally guilty of manslaughter. This 'identification' doctrine was 
described in HL Bolton v Grahams & Sons Ltd4:  
 
A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has 
a brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has 
hands which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions 
from the centre. Some of the people in the company are mere 
servants and agents who are nothing more than the hand to do the 
work and cannot be said to represent the mind and will. Others are 
directors and managers who represent the directing mind and will 
of the company, and control what it does. The state of mind of 
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these managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated 
by the law as such. 
 
In Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Natrass,5 three different judges gave three 
slightly different interpretations of who could be defined as participating in 
the controlling mind. Lord Reid sated that the following individuals were 
controlling minds of a company: 
 
the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps other 
superior officers of a company [who] carry out the functions of 
management and speak and act as the company. 
 
Viscount Dilhorne gave a more limited interpretation saying that a 
controlling mind is a person 
 
who is in actual control of the operations of a company or of part 
of them and who is not responsible to another person in the 
company for the manner in which he discharges his duties in the 
sense of being under his orders. 
 
Lord Diplock stated that the people who form the controlling mind are those 
 
who by the memorandum and articles of association or as a result 
of action taken by the directors or by the company in general 
meeting pursuant to the articles are entrusted with the exercise of 
the powers of the company. 
 
Mr Justice Taylor had to wrestle with the concept of the controlling mind in 
the ensuing prosecution of P & O Ferries in the Herald case6, when he 
stated, 
 
where a corporation, through the controlling mind of one of its 
agents, does an act which fulfils the pre-requisites for the crime of 
manslaughter, it is properly indictable for the crime of 
manslaughter. 
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Although such conclusions highlighted the difficulties of a prosecution 
against P & O, this did not discourage the Director of Public Prosecutions 
from pursuing the owners of the Herald. Judicial review of the coroner's 
inquest persuaded the Director of Public Prosecutions to bring manslaughter 
charges against P&O European Ferries and seven employees, but it was 
apparent that the evidence adduced by the Prosecution was insufficient to 
establish the elements of the common law crime of corporate manslaughter 
beyond reasonable doubt, which demanded that a causal link be established 
EHWZHHQ WKH &RPSDQ\¶V FRQWUROOLQJ PLQG DQG DQ LQGLYLGXDO JXLOW\ RI
manslaughter and, thus, it would be unsafe to direct the Jury to reach a 
verdict on the evidence. As a result there was no case to answer and the 
judge ruled that the prosecution was not in a position to satisfy the essential 
'doctrine of identification'7. 
Crucially, this also demonstrated the distance that lay between the 
Master and the accountability of their employer in the context of corporate 
manslaughter; while the Wreck Commissioner held the Master responsible8 
for taking the ship to sea in an unsafe condition and whose negligence 
contributed to the cause of the casualty, without the causal link the company 
itself was not criminally accountable. Naturally this was consistent with the 
FRUSRUDWHSRVLWLRQZLWKUHJDUGWRWKH0DVWHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQWKHIRXQGDWLRQIRU
the nautical fault defence in the Hague-Visby Rules9, so it all made sense. 
,Q WKH OLJKW RI WKH /DZ &RPPLVVLRQ¶V UHSRUW LQ 10 the Select 
Committee on Home Affairs and Work and Pensions set its face to drafting 
D %LOO WKDW UHIOHFWHG WKH *RYHUQPHQW¶V GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WR HQDEOH more 
prosecutions to proceed by tackling the difficulties created by the 
identification principle11. The new proposals were intended to change the 
basis of liability, from the requirement of identifying the causal link from 
an individual guilty of manslaughter to the controlling mind of the company, 
to liability founded on accountability for the way in which an organisation's 
activities are managed or organised by its senior managers12. In this way it 
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was the intention of Parliament to close down the possibility that a 
shipowner could avoid criminal liability for corporate manslaughter, in the 
way encountered in the case of the Herald, simply by failing to get a director 
found guilty of individual manslaughter.   
Meanwhile, the normative ethics of society were pressing their 
demands for corporate accountability for manslaughter, which became ever 
PRUH IRUFHIXO ZLWK HDFK VXFFHVVLYH FDVXDOW\ 3DUOLDPHQW VDZ 3 	 2¶V
position in the Herald case as highlighting an inconsistency with those 
normative ethics; essentially, society was demanding a corporate head to 
roll for manslaughter, but the question of fairness made a solution more 
difficult to divine and this, of course, underpinned the positions adopted by 
the corporate lobby and the workforce lobby respectively. The attitude 
adopted by Parliament was particularly noticeable in the wake of the 
Marchioness disaster in August 1989. The MAIB report13 made a number 
of findings, the principal one being that the collision occurred because 
neither vessel observed the other until it was too late. Further factors, inter 
alia, involved design defects which seriously restricted visibility from the 
wheelhouse of each vessel, both vessels were using the same, middle part 
of the fairway and the centre arches of the bridges across the river, and clear 
instructions were not given to the forward look-out of the Bowbelle. That 
being said, the report clearly concluded: 
 
Both vessels were properly certificated, in sound condition, and 
manned in accordance with the appropriate requirements. In both 
vesselVWKHEULGJHRUZKHHOKRXVHZHUHSURSHUO\PDQQHG«%RWK
vessels were proceeding at a speed which was consistent with the 
requirements of the Collision regulations and PLA Bye-ODZV«
There was no wilful misconduct in either vessel contributing to the 
collision, the foundering or the loss of life. In as much as personal 
fault was responsible for the accident, that fault lies with those in 
direct charge of the two vessels at the time and with those 
responsible for both the perpetration and the acceptance of their 
faulty design. 
 
Before the report was published, the DPP instituted manslaughter 
proceedings against the Master of the Bowbelle, Captain Henderson, for 
failing to ensure a proper lookout and thereby causing damage to another 
ship and death or personal injury contrary to Section 27 Merchant Shipping 
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Act 197014; the first jury failed to reach a verdict, as did the second, and a 
verdict of not guilty was duly entered on the charge when the Prosecution 
abandoned the case.15   
It is very apparent that the MAIB found no evidence which might have 
had some probative value towards the culpability of either owner for 
PDQVODXJKWHUEXWWKLVGLGQRWGLVFRXUDJH3DUOLDPHQW¶V+RPH$IIDLUVDQG
Work and Pensions Committees taking partisan and unbalanced evidence 
arising out of the Marchioness disaster which was published in the First 
Joint Report of Session 2005-06 for the Draft Corporate Manslaughter 
Bill16. Mrs Dallaglio of the Marchioness victim support group was invited 
to give evidence, when she stated inter alia, 
 
In every respect of the Marchioness tragedy, from my own 
experience and what I have experienced within our committee, 
WKHVHFRPSDQLHVWRRN)UDQFHVFD¶VOLIHXQODZIXOO\« 
 
The Chairman commented on the accountability of the owners thus: 
 
As the Bill stands at the moment, the companies would be 
FRQYLFWHG« 
 
The Chairman clearly aspired to pursue the function of a Court; 
whether or not as a way to pour oil on the troubled waters of the emotive 
nature of the evidence which he admitted is open to question but, if that 
were the case, it failed. When asked whether he thought that there was 
evidence in the Marchioness case that the directors had taken 
insufficient account of health and safety, witness Mr Perks replied:
  
 
,QGHHG \HV <RX KDG SHRSOH ZDQGHULQJ DERXW« &DQ , VDy it,   
&KDLUPDQ" 7KH FRPSDQLHV" « Obviously they walked away 
clapping their hands. We saw them across the road. 
 
It must be borne in mind that this evidence was being admitted as part of a 
process to review the current law; the admission of such evidence merely 
served to devalue its probative value. When pressed for her opinion on 
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whether existing health and safety legislation could be used to identify that 
somebody had been in breach of that, Mrs Dallaglio replied:  
 
I am not a lawyer. I was a woman who was highly traumatised for 
a lengthy period of time by the loss of my daughter. I put that in 
the hands of you people here. 
 
Ivor Glogg, who had been widowed in the accident, had brought a private 
prosecution which failed, and Mrs Dallaglio was allowed her evidence:  
 
He felt very strongly about it. He had his own company. They 
bankrupted him, these corporate companies. They bankrupted 
him. He went through God knows how many courts. I attended all 
of them. Again, bogged down with arcs of visions, technicalities 
RIODZSRLQWVRIODZWKH\ZHUHWKURZQRXW«KHZDVRQWKHYHUJH
of going to the crown court then but did not have enough money. 
They bankrupted him. 
 
The emotive nature of the evidence upon which condemnation was brought 
on the owner simply flew in the face of the MAIB report, as well as the 
decision of the stipendiary magistrate in Bow Street Magistrates Court, in 
the private prosecution brought by Mr Glogg against South Coast Shipping, 
owners of the Bowbelle, and four senior managers of the company, the 
manslaughter charges being dismissed in June 1992 on the grounds that 
there was insufficient evidence against any of the defendants to commit 
them for trial.17  
This did not discourage Parliament in its mission to satisfy the social 
demand for corporate criminal accountability, in order to make it easier to 
get a conviction, whatever the experts might say. That mission was 
accomplished with the Corporate Manslaughter Act. 
 
The Demands of Normative Ethics 
 
,Q WKH ZLGHU WHUPV RI MXULVSUXGHQFH 3DUOLDPHQW¶V mission may be 
justified. Society has entrusted to Parliament the function of defining and 
controlling just what society holds to be a moral wrong; that, itself, is 
enforced by a power which is maintained quite separately from Parliament 
and vested in the Courts, which Lord Simons described in Shaw v DPP18 as 
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a residual power to conserve not only the safety and order but also the moral 
welfare of the state. 
The normative ethics underpinning concepts of Justice bear a heavy 
burden in regulating criminal accountability. The fairness of criminal justice 
systems naturally relies on checks and balances and on good faith on the 
part of legislators and judges19 WR PDLQWDLQ VRFLHW\¶V PRUDO VWDQGDUGV LQ
liability and sentencing. Bauman attaches a very high value to the effect 
which social and political trends have in moderating the humanity and 
reasonableness in punitive justice20, and the emotive responses recorded in 
WKH ZRUNLQJ FRPPLWWHH¶V LQTXLU\ LQ WKH &RUSRUDWH 0DQVODXJKWHU %LOO
QDWXUDOO\ LQIRUPHG 3DUOLDPHQW¶V RSLnion on the contemporary moral 
standards attached to corporate accountability; whether the quality of 
moderation was achieved, remains to be analysed. 
The normative ethics of a society naturally characterise its 
understanding of Justice in its own terms which, thus accords it a subjective 
definition; but objectively, Justice must be envisaged as a set of moral rules 
ZKLFK GHSHQG KHDYLO\ RQ WKH PRGHUDWLRQ RI VRFLHW\¶V PRUDO VWDQGDUGV
Society evolves in response to internal change and external stimuli and, with 
it, the concept has evolved of a risk which might threaten the security of that 
society. Ericson and Carrière have defined this in terms of what they label a 
µULVNVRFLHW\¶LQZKLFKVRFLHW\KDVEHFRPHSUHRFFXSLHGZLWKWKHFRQFHSWRI
risk management for the protection of public safety21. Naturally the solution 
which is developed by a democratic risk society delivers a body of 
legislation which satisfies those crucial normative ethics; but as the history 
of corporate manslaughter at Common Law so signally failed to secure 
FRQYLFWLRQVDJDLQVWWKHVKLSRZQHUV3DUOLDPHQW¶VVROXWLRQWRGHOLYHU6WDWXWH
Law  designed to facilitate such convictions, stands in dynamic tension with 
basic legal rights of fairness,  which corporate bodies must share with all 
other bodies in the eyes of the law; but such a right is exposed to the risk of 
suspension in favour of the solution which meets the social demand. 
+XGVRQ¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHULVNVRFLHW\FDQEHGHYHORSHGWRHPEUDFHWKHULJKWV
of all legal bodies, which must confroQWWKHULVNVRFLHW\¶VQHHGWRWUDGHVXFK
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rights against the enforcement of the criminal law and consequential 
punishment:    
 
The balance between pursuit of crime control restraints and 
maintenance of principled limits on punishment is essentially a 
calculation of what rights, for how long, and with what 
justification, are to be suspended in the interests of security.22 
  
It is this dynamic tension which led to the iniquity of facilitating convictions 
through the medium of applying a civil test of negligence: what are the 
consequences of the defendant¶V FRQGXFW" 5DWKHU WKDQ WKH FULPLQDO WHVW
what was the defendant¶VJXLOW\PLQG" 
In the maritime context, this can be well-illustrated by the case of 
Captain  Wolfgang Schröder23, Master of the Zim Mexico III who was 
convicted of homicide. In March 2006 Captain Schröder had been in 
command of the vessel, in a compulsory pilotage area, when she collided 
with a port-side crane at Mobile, Alabama. The consequence led to the death 
of a dock-worker, in what mariners worldwide believed to be a mere error 
RI MXGJPHQW &DSWDLQ 6FKU|GHU ZDV LQGLFWHG XQGHU WKH 6HDPDQ¶V
Manslaughter Statute as Master of the ship for misconduct, negligence, or 
inattention to his duties on the vessel, resulting in the death of the dock 
worker. The jury convicted him and he faced a sentence of imprisonment of 
up to 16 months. At his sentencing, said Judge Callie Granade, District 
Judge for the United States District Court for the Southern District of 
Alabama, noted that the law required jurors to find that Schröder was guilty 
of simple negligence, a lower standard of unlawfulness more commonly 
associated with civil disputes. Her comment is worth repeating: 
 
While I certainly do not discount the terrible consequences that 
have resulted from this negligence, what he has been convicted of 
is really a civil offense. 
 
The problem arises in that the characteristics which define guilt in criminal 
law are very different from those for establishing liability in civil law. That 
said, however, the laws of the twentieth century evolved in a process of 
criminalisation to make a defendant guilty of a crime based on the principles 
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upon which liability in negligence is founded. It is axiomatic, therefore, that 
the modern tort of negligence came first. 
Street on Torts presents a good starting point for a definition24. The 
key question which must be addressed in civil law is how the law must 
reconcile competing interests. The objective of civil law is to compensate 
the Claimant for the consequence of the unlawful act or omission. The 
mental element is irrelevant: the civil law confines itself to the question as 
to whether the defendant was to blame for the consequence which occurred. 
An act, even though it is malicious, will not incur tortious liability unless 
the interest violated is protected in tort. 
In contrast to the civil law, crimes are wrongs which threaten the well-
being of Society to the extent that compensation to the victim is not enough; 
Society must be protected25. Save for offences of strict liability, every crime 
demands the satisfaction of two elements:  
 
1 The actus reus contains all the elements in the definition of the crime 
except the defendant's mental element. It is generally, but not invariably, 
made up of the defendant's conduct and sometimes the consequences of that 
conduct, as well as the circumstances in which the conduct took place. 
 
2  The Prosecution must also establish the defendant's Guilty Mind, or 
mens rea. The primary function of the Prosecution case therefore must be 
to establish the defendant's intention to commit the crime26. A result is 
intended when it is established beyond reasonable doubt as the defendant's 
purpose - that is, that it was the intended result.  
 
The requirement of mens rea remains the key issue in determining criminal 
accountability; this most ancient of bastions in criminal law was upheld by 
Lord Reid in Sweet v Parsley27, in the presumption that Parliament does not 
intend to make criminals of people who are not blameworthy for what they 
did28, quoting the venerable Brett J in R v Prince29: 
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 Upon all the cases I think it is proved that there can be no 
conviction for crime in England in the absence of a criminal mind 
or mens rea. 
 
The demands made by the requirement of mens rea on criminal liability 
require some qualification of the general principle, if a person, who does not 
intend to cause a harmful result, takes an unjustifiable risk of causing it. 
Such is the foundation of recklessness, in which either the defendant was 
aware of its existence or, in the case of an obvious risk, the defendant failed 
to give any thought to the possibility of its existence30.  
The constant factor touches upon the defendant¶VVWDWHRIPLQGIn R 
v G31 Lord Bingham articulated the point beyond any doubt that conviction 
of a serious crime should depend on proof not simply that the defendant 
caused (by act or omission) an injurious result to another but that his state 
of mind when so acting was culpable. Taking an obvious and significant risk 
by intention or recklessness would satisfy Lord Bingham of a guilty mind 
but not if the defendant did not perceive the risk. In his words: 
 
Such a person may fairly be accused of stupidity or lack of 
imagination, but neither of those failings should expose him to 
conviction of serious crime or the risk of punishment. 
 
A succession of cases over decades exposed the need to define just how 
evidence of the defendant¶VVWDWHRIPLQGVKRXOGXQGHUSLQJURVVQHJOLJHQFH
until, in 1995, the case of R v Adomako32 established that the defendant can 
be convicted of gross negligence manslaughter in the absence of evidence 
to his state of mind. In this case the defendant was the anaesthetist during 
an eye operation on a patient. in the course of the operation the tube from 
the ventilator supplying oxygen to the patient became disconnected. the 
defendant failed to notice the disconnection for some six minutes before the 
patient suffered a cardiac arrest, from which he subsequently died. The 
defendant was charged with manslaughter. At his trial it was conceded on 
behalf of the defendant that he had been negligent in the tortious 
understanding of the word and medical evidence was called by the Crown 
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that the defendant had shown a gross dereliction of care. The judge directed 
the jury that the test to be applied was whether the defendant had been guilty 
of gross negligence. The defendant was convicted. 
Hearing the Appeal, the Lord Chancellor, Lord MacKay, referred to 
the opinion of Lord Hewart CJ in R v Bateman33 in underpinning his 
conclusion that the criminal law requires a fair and reasonable standard of 
care and competence in individuals in the position of Mr Adomako, 
according to the evidence required to establish liability in the civil tort of 
negligence. This alone creates a serious problem in the judicial process, for, 
in civil cases, the Claimant must persuade the Court that it has proved on 
the Balance of Probabilities the requisites for establishing liability, whereas 
in criminal cases, the Prosecution must persuade the Court that the case 
against the defendant is proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt, by applying the 
evidence to the body of criminal law with all those characteristics special to 
it; that is, including the mens rea.   
$V LI WKH PLVFKLHI LQ WKH &RXUW¶V GHFLVLRQ ZDV QRW FOHDU HQRXJK
however, the judge further held that 
 
«in order to support an indictment for manslaughter the 
Prosecution must prove the matters necessary to establish civil 
liability (except pecuniary loss), and, in addition, must satisfy the 
jury that the negligence or incompetence of the Accused went 
beyond a mere matter of compensation and showed such disregard 
for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the 
State and conduct deserving punishment.  
 
The judge's observations on the application of civil liability massively 
outweigh that devoted to criminal liability; but, to summarise the principle 
in this case, the jury needs to consider whether 
 
x the defendant owed a duty of care to the deceased; and  
x he was in breach of that duty; and 
x the breach was so grossly negligent that it should be seen as criminal; 
LQ/RUG0DF.D\¶VZRUGV 
 
«JURVVQHJOLJHQFH«GHSHQGV«RQWKHVHULRXVQHVVRI WKHEUHDFK
of the duty committed by the defendant in all the circumstances in 
which he was placed when it occurred and whether, having regard 
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to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so 
EDGLQDOOWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVDVWRDPRXQWLQWKHMXU\¶VMXGJPHQWWR
a criminal act or omission. 
 
The whole issue of the defendant¶VVWDWHRIPLQGKLVmens rea for the crime, 
has therefore been put into the form of an objective test determined by the 
circumstances and grafted on to the evidential test required for liability in 
civil proceedings. At least, that is, for manslaughter; the requirements to 
establish guilt for Criminal Damage bring us back to the logic of the House 
of Lords decision in R v G, which demanded that the subjective standard 
should apply; but in the case of corporate manslaughter you need an 
individual to whom the standard must be applied, and that would not suit 
3DUOLDPHQW¶VQHHGVDWDOO 
Ultimately, the yawning gap between civil and criminal liability was, 
and remains, the burden of proving the essential elements; if put to the test 
in criminal proceedings, the jury must consider some ethereal concept which 
criminalises what is essentially a tortfeasor, but in this case is the criminal 
defendant, and the only way in which the law has developed that, as seen in 
Adomako, obliges the jury to apply an objective standard to a test for 
establishing a guilty mind. At the very least, the concept of criminal 
negligence is vague and open to interpretation; that is, its very definition is 
subjective. To establish such culpability by an objective test invites its 
rejection.   
6SHDNLQJ LQ WKH /RQGRQ 6KLSSLQJ /DZ &HQWUH¶V th Cadwallader 
Memorial Lecture in 2005, Epaminondas Embiricos took the part of 
advocate for the industry, making a valid point in a critical analysis of the 
EU Directive on Criminal Sanctions for Ship Source Pollution: 
 
7KHWHUPµVHULRXVQHJOLJHQFH¶LVYDJXHVXEMHFWLYHDQGLOOGHILQHG.   
Yet, it is a fundamental principle that criminal law must be clear 
DQG VSHFLILF   7KXV WKH WHUP µVHULRXV QHJOLJHQFH¶ LV legally 
defective and inconsistent with the global regime.   It is imprecise, 
subjective and lacks clarity and will therefore be most prejudicial 
to the accused in the climate of public sentiment commonly 
experienced after a pollution incident34. 
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If behaviour is to be the subject of control by criminal law, it is essential 
that the law in question is, at the very least, precise. The Courts must apply 
the definition of the crime according to the intention of the body that 
legislated it and, so, they are presented with an exceptional problem when 
the Intention of Parliament is impossible to fathom in a given circumstance, 
such as with a term that is vague and whose defining principles were 
founded on decisions in civil proceedings whose process is different from 
that in question ± as we find in the situation in which the modern law of 
negligence, stemming from a claim for damages arising out of a bottle of 
contaminated ginger beer35 that must be determined on the balance of 
probabilities according to civil evidence procedures, has driven the criminal 
law in which criminal evidence procedures must deliver a verdict beyond 
reasonable doubt. This scenario takes us firmly into the realm of 
Jurisprudence, which is the foundation stone of good governance. Kelsen 
expressed the Pure Theory of Law simply36: 
 
As a theory it is exclusively concerned with accurate definition of 
its subject-matter. 
 
It is against this background that we must consider how Parliament has met 
the demands of jurisprudence with its legislation for corporate 
manslaughter. 
 
What normative ethics wanted, and what it got: The Corporate 
Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 
 
7KH$FWUHSUHVHQWV3DUOLDPHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQWRDYRLGWKHKD]DUGV
to a successful prosecution illustrated by the Herald and Marchioness 
casualties. The problem is that the mechanism for this process is dependent 
upon the very ill which was articulated by Judge Grenade in the Schröder 
case.  
The offence is described in Section 1, by which an organisation is 
guilty of an offence if the way in which its activities are managed or 
organised (a) causes a person's death, and (b) amounts to a gross breach of 
a relevant duty of care owed by the organisation to the deceased.  But it is 
guilty of an offence only if the way in which its activities are managed or 
organised by its senior management is a substantial element in that breach. 
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For the purposes of WKLV$FW D µUHOHYDQWGXW\RI FDUH¶ IRU WKH VKLSRZQHU
PHDQVDQ\RIWKHIROORZLQJGXWLHVRZHGE\LWµXQGHUWKHODZRIQHJOLJHQFH¶
namely a duty owed to its employees or to other persons working for the 
organisation or performing services for it; a duty owed as occupier of 
premises; or a duty owed in connection with the supply of goods or services, 
the carrying on by the organisation of any construction or maintenance 
operations, the carrying on by the organisation of any other activity on a 
commercial basis, or the use or keeping by the organisation of any plant, 
vehicle or other thing. As if that were not enough, it can be understood that 
duties of care commonly owed by shipowners include the duty owed by an 
employer to his employees to provide a safe system of work, whether that 
be shipboard or shoreside, and will include dock workers or others working 
on the ship. Naturally, duties of care also arise out of the activities that are 
conducted by shipowners transporting passengers and lawful ± as well as 
unlawful ± YLVLWRUV$EUHDFKRIDGXW\RIFDUHE\DQRUJDQLVDWLRQLVDµJURVV¶
breach if the conduct alleged to amount to a breach of that duty falls far 
below what can reasonably be expected of the organisation in the 
FLUFXPVWDQFHV µVHQLRU PDQDJHPHQW¶ PHDQV the persons who play 
significant rôles in the making of decisions about how the whole or a 
substantial part of its activities are to be managed or organised, or the actual 
managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those activities. 
The explanatory notes state that this reflects the position under the 
common law offence of gross negligence manslaughter and, by defining the 
necessary relationship between the defendant organisation and victim, sets 
out the broad scope of the offence. Thus, while the common law offence of 
manslaughter by gross negligence is abolished in its application to 
corporations, the key mischief of applying the principles of civil liability 
modified for criminal accountability remains. 
Section 8 addresses factors for the jury to consider if it is established 
that an organisation owed a relevant duty of care to a person, and it falls to 
the jury to decide whether there was a gross breach of that duty. The jury 
must consider, for example, whether the evidence shows that the 
organisation failed to comply with any health and safety legislation that 
relates to the alleged breach, and if so, how serious that failure was and how 
much of a risk of death it posed. Of course, the complexity arises in this 
respect in that µIDLOXUHWRFRPSO\¶PXVWEHLVRODWHGIURPµOLDELOLW\¶IRUWKH
strict liability required in health and safety offences turns the burden of 
proof on to the defendant to prove due diligence, an alien concept in the 
establishment of negligence at Common Law, which is demanded by 
Section 2(1). As a result, statutory duties owed under health and safety law 
are not relevant duties for the purpose of the 2007 Act37. 
Subsection 3 allows the jury also to consider the extent to which the 
evidence shows that there were attitudes, policies, systems or accepted 
practices within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any 
such failure as is mentioned in subsection (2), or to have produced tolerance 
of it; and to have regard to any health and safety guidance that relates to the 
DOOHJHG EUHDFK 7KH QHHG IRU H[SHUW HYLGHQFH WR HQOLJKWHQ WKH MXU\¶V
understanding must be applied to the eye-witness evidence, particularly in 
the case of a large shipowning company with complex management 
structures; at least such a prosecution will provide gainful employment to 
maritime consultants, whose opinions must, yet, be explained with clarity 
to jurors whose knowledge of shipboard management is unlikely to embrace 
rapid comprehension. But then subsection 4 states that the jury may still 
consider any other matters they feel to be relevant ± and in a case in which 
emotive issues are admitted in evidence, such vague guidance presses hard 
on the concept of fairness, indeed, on the chance of an appeal against 
conviction if the judge misdirected it. 
In order to keep the matter in sharp focus, the Sentencing Guidelines 
Council emphasised the obligation on the Prosecution to prove each of these 
elements to the criminal standard required of this Act, as well as pointing 
out the contrast between corporate manslaughter and strict liability offences 
enacted under health and safety laws, which require the establishment of a 
due diligence defence if liability is to be avoided.38 
The glaring issue, then, compels the Prosecution in a corporate 
manslaughter case to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the breach of 
duty of care was a significant cause of death, although it need not be the 
only cause, while the more modest demands upon an indictment containing 
health and safety counts allow the Prosecution to establish guilt against a 
company without having to adduce evidence that injury was caused by the 
failure to ensure safety; it would then be for the company to establish a due 
diligence defence. The issue turns on the requirement under corporate 
manslaughter to establish both a gross breach of duty of care and some 
senior management failure as a substantial element in that breach, the effect 
of which demands that the Prosecution will generally need to establish a 
failure in the management system; by contrast the strict liability raised in 
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health and safety offences demands that the successful defendant must show 
that it was not reasonably practicable with due diligence to avoid a risk of 
injury or lack of safety. If, in this circumstance, the management failure is 
DWDQRSHUDWLRQDOUDWKHUWKDQV\VWHPLFOHYHOWKHQIRUH[DPSOHWKH0DVWHU¶V
negligence may only lead to a minimal failure to reach the standard of 
reasonable practicability demanded by the Act. In this case the Company 
will not be held accountable for manslaughter. 
For the bewildered shipowner, the serious issue underlying the new 
Statute can be epitomised in that there need no longer be a causal link 
between the fatality and the controlling mind of the company; now the 
0DVWHU¶VEHKDYLRur may incriminate their employer even though they are 
not part of the controlling mind of the company, because the death must 
have been caused merely by a management failure; it need not even have 
been the sole cause of death, but if the Master who, after all, plays 
significant strategic or regulatory compliance rôles in the management of 
WKHZKROHRUDVXEVWDQWLDOSDUWRI WKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VDFWLYLWLHVEHKDYHVLQ
such a way that their conduct falls far below what could reasonably have 
been expected, then the shipowner will be guilty of the offence39. It must be 
said, that this introduces an inconsistency with the legal theory which 
XQGHUOLHVFRUSRUDWH UHVSRQVLELOLW\ IRU WKH0DVWHU¶VXQDVVDLODEOHGLVFUHWLRQ
which is currently enshrined in SOLAS V Regulation 34 and duly amended 
very slightly in English law by 2011 Regulations40.41 If the shipowner is 
QRZWREHUHVSRQVLEOHFULPLQDOO\IRUWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKH0DVWHU¶VGLVFUHWLRQ
then it must logically demand that the shipowner must have the power to 
override the Master in the exercise of that discretion, which of course 
offends SOLAS as well as the provisions of Code 5 of ISM42. 
As if to remove any lingering doubt or loophole in the application of 
WKH  $FW 6HFWLRQ  VSHFLILFDOO\ DSSOLHV WKH RIIHQFH WR WKH 8.¶V 
territorial sea as well as to any UK-registered ship anywhere in the world, 
whether or not any mishap occurred which led to the foundering of the ship. 
Overall, the drafting experts made a thorough job of ensuring that the Act 
would be applied vigorously to the maritime scenario; and there is no doubt 
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that companies are understandably shy of exposing themselves any more 
WKDQ LV DEVROXWHO\ HVVHQWLDO WR VXFK D ULVN 7KH 0DVWHU¶V FRQGXFW LV QRW
QHFHVVDULO\IDWDOWRWKHFRPSDQ\¶VSRVLWLRQ± but the potential for criminal 
litigation is obvious. For example, there is no doubt that Tasman Orient Line 
had excellent company standing orders in place in the case of the Tasman 
Pioneer43, demonstrating a management system which would successfully 
pass any test of reasonableness; what would be open to issue, was how the 
0DVWHU¶V FRQGXFW LQ WKDW FDVH PLJKW KDYH LQFULPLQDWHG WKH FRPSDQ\KDG
there been a fatality as a result.    
 
 
The 2007 Act - a matter of Justice 
 
The evolution of the modern law of corporate manslaughter has 
brought us from the Herald to the case of Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings 
Limited44 µ&*¶ 
The case arose out of the death of a geologist who was killed in 2008 
when a trial pit in which he was working collapsed on top of him. Alexander 
Wright was employed by CG as a junior geologist, when he was taking soil 
samples from inside a pit which had been excavated as part of a site survey 
when the sides of the pit collapsed, crushing him. In addition to the charge 
under the 1007 Act, he was charged with failing to discharge a duty contrary 
to Section 33 of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974. 
The Prosecution case was that CG had failed to update and comply 
with its own risk assessments, and had failed to take all reasonably 
practicable steps to prevent the deceased from working in a dangerous way. 
By virtue of Section 1 of the Act, the Company prima facie would be 
guilty if the way in which its activities were managed or organised (a) 
FDXVHG0U:ULJKW¶VGHDWKDQGEDPRXQWHGWRDJURVVEUHDFKRIDUHOHYDQt 
duty of care owed by the company to the deceased. The demands of Section 
1(3) required that, once this had been established, the Prosecution to prove 
WKDWWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKH&RPSDQ\¶VDFWLYLWLHVZHUHPDQDJHGRURUJDQLVHG
by its senior management was a substantial element in the breach of the 
relevant duty of care. 
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The jury returned a verdict of guilty. 
 
Taking the step beyond the question of liability, sentencing has been 
addressed, in the guidelines published by the Sentencing Guidelines Council 
in 2010 which ominously counselled the sentencing judge to look carefully 
at both turnover and profit, and also at assets, in order to gauge the resources 
of the defendant. CG arguably escaped lightly with a fine of just £385,000 
which was to be paid over ten years at a rate of £38,500 per annum. It was 
certainly less than the starting point of £500,000 recommended by the 
Sentencing Guidelines Council - and the plea in mitigation of a shipowner 
with significant assets and cash reserves might not be received so 
sympathetically. Not that CG found it particularly sympathetic, but Mr 
Justice Field concluded:  
 
It may well be that the fine in the terms of its payment will put this 
company into liquidation. If that is the case it's unfortunate but 
unavoidable. But it's a consequence of the serious breach. 
 
Individuals cannot be prosecuted under the Act, and Peter Eaton, the 
&RPSDQ\¶V VROH 'LUHFWRU ZDV FKDUJHG VHSDUDWHO\ ZLWK WKH FRPPRQ ODZ
offence of gross negligence manslaughter45. But there was the rub, as well, 
for this was clearly a small company, the sort of entity (and the only sort of 
entity) which had previously been successfully prosecuted under the 
common law, in which it was easier for the Prosecution to incriminate senior 
management and their rôle within the Company. A larger company has yet 
to face prosecution; as a result, the conviction in this case sheds very little 
light on just how more effective the 2007 Act will be in securing 
convictions, than the old common law requirement for an individual to be 
conYLFWHGZKRVHFDXVDO OLQNZLWKWKHFRPSDQ\¶VFRQWUROOLQJPLQGFDQEH
established. It was, in effect, just as simple as the case of R v OLL and 
Kite46. 
In November 1994, OLL Limited, an outdoor activity company, and 
its managing director Peter Kite were convicted of the manslaughter of four 
students of Southway Comprehensive School in Plymouth, aged between 
16 and 17, who died during a canoeing trip in Lyme Regis, Dorset in March 
1993. OLL had organised and managed the basic canoe course; but the two 
instructors who OLL had sent out to sea with the students on the course were 
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little wiser than the students, for their expertise had been limited to a three-
day training assessment, just one week earlier, in which they had received 
the basic canoe instructions that they were expected to pass on to the 
teenagers. They had both been placed in the novice group and were barely 
competent to undertake the journey themselves, let alone  put in charge of 
the students. Nine months earlier, two experienced instructors had written 
to the centre about levels of safety and warned that unless standards of safety 
were improved\RXPD\ILQG\RXUVHOYHVWU\LQJWRH[SODLQZK\VRPHRQH¶V
son or daughter will not be coming home. They resigned; Mr Kite carried 
on regardless. 
With the inevitability of Greek tragedy, the group was swept out to 
sea, and subsequently capsized. The Centre had not provided any distress 
flares and had not informed the coastguard of the expedition. OLL was 
convicted of corporate manslaughter under the prevailing common law and 
was fined £60,000. Mr Kite was sentenced to three years imprisonment 
UHGXFHG WR WZR RQ DSSHDO WKH &HQWUH¶V PDQDJHU -RVHSK 6WRGGDUW ZDV
acquitted of manslaughter. 
The key issue in this study is that size matters. OLL Limited was a 
small comSDQ\DQGSURYLQJWKDW0U.LWHZDVLWVµFRQWUROOLQJPLQG¶DQGKDG
acted negligently was easily achieved. CG was an equally small company 
and the Prosecution would have been able to establish that Mr Eaton had 
EHHQ LWV µFRQWUROOLQJ PLQG¶ MXVW DV HDVLO\ DV LW had been able to prove a 
µPDQDJHPHQWIDLOXUH¶UHVXOWLQJLQ0U:ULJKW¶VGHDWK:ULWLQJLQWKH/DZ
6RFLHW\¶V*D]HWWHRQWKHrd March 2011, David McCluskey expressed the 
sage opinion that the test of the new law has not yet come, and will not come 
until a large company with a large board of directors, faces prosecution47. 
Such a prosecution, though, is a long time coming. Lion Steel 
Equipment Ltd is a large company, with capital of some £1.5 million48, and 
has been indicted following the death of an employee who fell through the 
URRIRIDQLQGXVWULDOXQLWDWWKHFRPSDQ\¶V+\GHKHDGTXDUWHUVLQ7KH
company has also been charged under Sections 2 and 33 of the Health and 
Safety at Work Act 1974 (HSWA) for failing to ensure the safety at work 
of its employees. 
,QDGGLWLRQWKUHHRIWKHFRPSDQ\¶VGLUHFWRUVKDYHHDFKEHHQFKDUJHGZLWK
gross negligence manslaughter and also face charges under Section 37 of 
the 1974 Act for failing to ensure the safety at work of their employees. But 
                                                          
47
 0F&OXVNH\'7KH/DZ6RFLHW\¶V*D]HWWH7KH/DZ6RFLHW\/RQGRQ 
 
48
 Annual Return of Company Information (ARO1) 15 February 2012. 
 
the trial has been scheduled for the summer of 2012. We burn with 
anticipation. 
So far, therefore, analysis of the effect of the new Act upon 
shipowners can be little more than speculation;   but it may be worth 
speculating with a case study based on a recent casualty. Mature and 
reflective analysis must await the publication of an accident report before 
rushing to judgment in the case of the Costa Concordia, which resulted in 
the deaths of 28 people. When the death toll had reached only six, and before 
the primary sources of evidence haGEHHQDQDO\VHG&RVWD¶Vchief executive, 
Pier Luigi Foschi categorically put the blame on the Master, emphasising 
WKH0DVWHU¶VDEVROXWHGLVFUHWLRQLQPDWWHUVRIQDYLJDWLRQSUHVXPDEO\XQGHU
SOLAS V), although confirming that deviations from the passage plan 
would be made with company approval during bad weather or if a vessel 
faced other navigational dangers49. Somewhat damningly, Mr Foschi 
GHVFULEHG DV UDVK WKH0DVWHU¶V GHFLVLRQ WR showboat the ship within 500 
metres of the island of Giglio. 
In February 2012, Nautilus International cautioned against such rush 
to judgment50 and General Secretary Mark Dickinson emphasised, rather, 
the importance of addressing safe manning and associated issues of hours 
of work, competence of crew and training issues, all of which are 
fundamental points addressed by the STCW Convention51. Notwithstanding 
the corporate manslaughter legislation adopted by Italy in 2008, we need to 
confine ourselves to the relevance of an intriguing question: what if the 
Costa Concordia had foundered in UK territorial waters? 
By virtue of Section 1 of the 2007 Act, the owner of the vessel would 
be accountable for corporate manslaughter if the way in which its activities 
were managed or organised by its senior management ± be it a senior 
director or the Master of the vessel whose responsibility was highlighted by 
Mr Foschi ± caused, or contributed a substantial part in the deaths of the 
innocent people, and amounted to a gross breach of a relevant duty of care 
owed by the organisation to the deceased. The relevant duty of care would 
be that owed by the company under the law of negligence. If the Master, 
with the absolute discretion at his disposal, had indeed pursued a frolic of 
KLVRZQFRQWUDU\ WR WKH&RPSDQ\¶VVKLSERDUGPDQDJHPHQWV\VWHP WKHQ
would it be fair that this Company, with its massive size and highly complex 
                                                          
49
 (DVRQ&/OR\G¶V/LVW-DQXDU\,QIRUPDSOF/RQGRQ 
 
50
 Anon, Telegraph, February 2012, Nautilus International, London. 
 
51
 International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch Keeping for Seafarers, 1978, with 
special reference to the Manila Amendments 2010 
management structure, should be held accountable for the deaths of the 28 
people on board? Whatever the answer, in order to discharge its function 
under Section 8, the jury would have to consider, firstly, whether there had 
been a management failure and, if so, whether the conduct that constituted 
this failure fell far below what could reasonably have been expected of that 
management. The evidence which they will consider, however, may be 
wider than one might expect if its probative value allows them to consider 
the extent to which there were attitudes, policies, systems or accepted 
practices within the organisation that were likely to have encouraged any 
such failure, or to have produced tolerance of it, particularly if Convention 
issues from SOLAS to STCW are held to be relevant. 
For the lawyer who must advise shipowners on their corporate 
accountability under the new 2007 Act, such speculation will, of course, 
have to wait upon further decisions such as that in Lion Steel, which 
inevitably will precede the conclusions on evidence in the Costa Concordia 
casualty. And speculation is always a dangerous thing: but it is intriguing, 
nevertheless.  
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